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but allow the city an opportunity to prepare and present a plan that will
remedy the vote dilution characteristic of the at-large electoral system.
Further, the Fourth Circuit stated that, if the city fails to comply, the
district court should prepare a single district plan for use in future city
council elections.
CIVIL & CRMNAL PROCEDURE

In Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia Bar, 872
F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a federal officer may remove a state bar disciplinary proceeding to a federal district court pursuant to the federal officer
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1442 (1982). The West Virginia State
Bar Committee on Legal Ethics accused United States Attorney William
Kolibash of negligent supervision of a subordinate and failure to disclose
salient information in a court investigation of charges of conflict of interest
against that subordinate. Kolibash petitioned under the federal officer
removal statute to remove the state bar disciplinary proceeding to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The federal
district court refused to order removal of the case and remanded the
proceedings to the West Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics.
Kolibash appealed to the Fourth Circuit, seeking reversal of the remand
order or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus compelling the district
court to retain jurisdiction.
In considering Kolibash's appeal, the Fourth Circuit first determined
that it could review the remand order. The Fourth Circuit noted that under
the federal officer removal statute a remand order is reviewable unless
removal was without jurisdiction and improvident. The court then stated
that the district court's decision to remand was a discretionary decision not
based on lack of jurisdiction and, therefore, reviewable on appeal. The
Fourth Circuit further held that removal was provident because Congress
designed the federal officer removal statute to protect federal officers from
state harassment in the performance of the officer's federal duties and that
the removal statute guaranteed federal officers a federal forum. As a result,
because the district court had jurisdiction to decide the removal request and
because removal in this case would be provident, the Fourth Circuit determined that it properly could review the district court's remand order.
After the Fourth Circuit found that it could review the district court's
order to remand the case, the Fourth Circuit examined Kolibash's pleadings
to determine if the federal officer removal statute should apply to the case.
The Fourth Circuit found Kolibash's pleadings substantially similar to a
claim of immunity, and thus the pleadings were sufficient to invoke the
federal officer removal statute. The Fourth Circuit, relying on Supreme
Court precedent, found that although the federal officer removal statute
generally requires a specific averment of a federal defense, the court properly
could liberally construe the pleadings in this case. The court stated that
general pleading will suffice to invoke the federal officer removal statute if
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that general pleading contains a statement alleging that the officer was
acting in the capacity of a federal officer. The court declined to decide
whether or not immunity attached in this case, stating that a colorable
immunity claim is enough to remove the proceedings to federal district court
and that the district court is the proper trier to resolve the immunity claim
under federal standards.
After finding Kolibash's pleadings sufficient to state a federal defense,
the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the language of the federal officer removal
statute to determine if the West Virginia State Bar disciplinary proceeding
met the statutory requirements of the federal officer removal statute. Relying
on precedent of the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the court stated
that courts should construe broadly the right of removal under the federal
officer removal statute. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, rejected the State
Bar's contention that a bar disciplinary proceeding is not a "civil action or
criminal prosecution commenced in a State court" as the removal statute
requires. The Fourth Circuit held that if a state investigatory proceeding is
adjudicatory in nature and a federal officer is subject to process in that
state proceeding, then the statutory requirements of the federal officer
removal statute are met.
In reaching its decision that Kolibash's case should be removed to
federal district court, the Fourth Circuit weighed the state interest in
regulating the legal profession against the federal interest in protecting
officials in performing their federal duties. The court found the balance in
favor of the federal interest. The Fourth Circuit expressed concern over the
potential for state interference with, and harassment of, federal officials
carrying out their duties. The Fourth Circuit viewed the removal statute as
a check on the potential threat of state interference with federal officials.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that, to avoid any local prejudices,
courts should apply federal rules of procedure under the federal officer
removal statute. The Fourth Circuit then held that the Southern District of
West Virginia was the appropriate forum in which to resolve the merits of
the case because the State Bar proceedings were commenced in the Southern
District of West Virginia and Kolibash filed a petition for removal in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case to the federal district court.
In Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1989), the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a dismissal by one federal court on
statute of limitations grounds bars later litigation of the identical claim
between the identical parties in a second federal court. On July 19, 1984,
Shoup was injured while operating a machine Bell & Howell had manufactured. On July 14, 1986, Shoup filed an action against Bell & Howell in
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas alleging injury due to the defective
design and manufacture of the machine. Because of untimely service on
Bell & Howell, Shoup had to reinstate her claims in January 1987. At that
time Bell & Howell received service and removed the case to the United
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on diversity
grounds. Bell & Howell then moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the applicable statute of limitations barred Shoup's claims. Because Bell &
Howell did not receive service until after the statute of limitations had run,
the Pennsylvania district court granted the motion. Shoup did not appeal.
On July 14, 1987, Shoup filed a suit against Bell & Howell in a
Maryland federal court and a Maryland state court. Upon consolidation of
the claims in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, Bell &
Howell argued that the prior dismissal of Shoup's action required the federal
court in Maryland to dismiss the action on res judicata grounds. The district
court denied Bell & Howell's motion for summary judgment, and Bell &
Howell appealed.
The Fourth Circuit noted that a three-pronged test governs claims of
res judicata. First, the parties must be the same or in privity with the
original parties. Second, the claims in the subsequent litigation must be
substantially the same as those in the prior litigation. Third, the earlier
litigation must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The Shoup
court stated that the third requirement was the sole issue in the case.
The Fourth Circuit initially disagreed with the district court's choice of
law. Unlike the district court's reliance on Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit
asserted that federal law determines the preclusive effect of a prior judgment
of a federal court. The Shoup court thus disregarded the lower court's
reliance on Maryland law and focused on FEDERAL RULE OF CR¢u PROCEDURE 41(b), which provides in part that:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the dismissal in the Pennsylvania federal
court was not one for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for
failure to join a party under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 19. The
Shoup court, therefore, concluded that the earlier dismissal operated as an
adjudication upon the merits.
The Fourth Circuit asserted that res judicata clearly applied in Shoup.
The prior Pennsylvania action involved the same claim and the same parties
as the subsequent suit. The Shoup court determined that requiring Bell &
Howell to litigate an identical action in Maryland would undercut the effect
of the Pennsylvania judgment, deplete limited judicial resources, and either
lead to an inconsistent judgment or require a party to prevail twice. Despite
the apparent harshness of res judicata, the Fourth Circuit maintained that
res judicata promotes economy in the use of judicial resources and of
finality in litigation.
Judge Murnaghan, in his dissenting opinion in Shoup, contended that
the Fourth Circuit's reading of rule 41(b) was too narrow. Judge Murnaghan
relied on Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 263 (1961), in arguing that
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the Shoup court should have read "jurisdiction" in rule 41(b) more expansively. Judge Murnaghan asserted that the United States Supreme Court in
Costello indicated that the lack of jurisdiction exception in rule 41(b)
included dismissals that are the result of a plaintiff's failure to comply with
a precondition to the court's determining the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
Judge Murnaghan believed that Shoup was a case in which the plaintiff
failed to comply with a precondition to the hearing of the plaintiff's claim.
The majority in Shoup distinguished Costello on the basis that the plaintiff
in Shoup did not fail to comply with any precondition to the hearing of
the plaintiff's claim.
In In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988), the
Fourth Circuit considered the discovery requests of the defendant, William
Pollard, from Martin Marietta Corporation. A grand jury indicted William
Pollard on one count of conspiring to defraud the United States Department
of Defense (DOD) and two counts of mail fraud. The DOD accused Pollard,
a former employee of Martin Marietta Corporation, of falsely inflating
Martin Marietta's travel budget and thereby defrauding the DOD, which
reimbursed Martin Marietta for travel expenses. After making various
disclosures to the prosecution, Martin Marietta was able to avoid indictment
and settle its controversy with the DOD. The government's case against
Pollard, however, continued.
Pollard, under FEDERAL RULE OF CBIImrAL PROCEDURE 17(c), requested
six categories of documents from Martin Marietta. Martin Marietta refused
to reveal documents from three of the six categories. The contested documents included: (1) workpapers, supporting documents, and internal audit
reports; (2) witness statements about Martin Marietta's dealings with travel
vouchers; (3) and all correspondence and notes of unwritten communications
between Martin Marietta and the DOD regarding their settlement agreement.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ordered
Martin Marietta to produce the contested documents at an in camera
hearing. At this hearing Martin Marietta admitted that it previously had
revealed portions of the requested documents to the DOD. The district
court then ordered Martin Marietta to disclose all the relevant documents
that Pollard had requested. Martin Marietta refused and appealed the
disclosure order.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit initially noted that rule 17(c) guarantees
an accused the sixth amendment right to have compulsory process to secure
evidence on the accused's behalf. To determine whether Pollard deserved
access to Martin Marietta's documents under rule 17(c), the district court
had employed the standards of relevancy, admissibility, and specificity that
the Supreme Court outlined in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700
(1974). The district court found that Pollard established these three elements
and, therefore, should have access to the documents. Martin Marietta argued
to the Fourth Circuit that the district court misapplied the three Nixon
requirements.
The Fourth Circuit noted that Martin Marietta carried a heavy burden
on appeal because, without a finding of abuse of discretion, an appellate
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court would hesitate to overrule a lower court's decision that an applicant
for a subpoena duces tecum had complied with rule 17(c). The Fourth
Circuit then applied the three-step Nixon test. First, the court concurred
with the district court's standard of review for the admissibility criterion.
The court concluded that Pollard had made a good faith effort to obtain
the requested documents and, consequently, satisfied the admissibility requirement. Second, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court applied
the correct standard for specificity and properly found that Pollard had
sufficiently described the documents. Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that
Pollard established relevancy, the third Nixon requirement, even though the
district court failed to make any detailed findings regarding relevancy. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, disposed of Martin Marietta's claim that the
district court abused its discretion by misapplying the Nixon requirements.
Martin Marietta next argued that either its attorney-client privilege or
its work-product privilege, or both, should protect the documents from
disclosure. Pollard countered that Martin Marietta's earlier disclosure of
the documents to the DOD impliedly waived Martin Marietta's attorneyclient and work-product privileges as to all the materials with the same
subject matter as the previously released documents. Martin Marietta responded that its prior actions created only a limited implied waiver which
would permit Pollard to discover only those documents that Martin Marietta
earlier had disclosed to the DOD.
The Fourth Circuit first analyzed Martin Marietta's claim of limited
implied waiver of its attorney-client privilege. The court found that precedent
in the Fourth Circuit follows the view that, if a client talks to the client's
attorney with the understanding that the attorney will disclose the information to others outside of the privileged relationship, the client waives the
attorney-client privilege to that information and to the details underlying
the information. After finding that Martin Marietta vitiated any confidentiality by disclosing documents to the DOD, the Fourth Circuit held that
Martin Marietta could not claim a limited implied waiver of its attorneyclient privilege over the documents. Thus, the court found that Martin
Marietta had to disclose to Pollard all of the documents that Martin Marietta
incorrectly claimed to be under an attorney-client privilege and that contained subject matter relating to the previously released documents.
The Fourth Circuit next reviewed Martin Marietta's claim of limited
implied waiver of its work-product privilege. The court examined the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
238 (1975), which addressed the issue of implied waiver. In Nobles defense
counsel sought to use the testimony of a private investigator to rebut the
testimony of two prosecution witnesses. Defense counsel, however, did not
want to release the private investigator's written report to the prosecution.
The Supreme Court held that if the private investigator testified, defense
counsel would have to disclose the investigator's written report to the
prosecution. According to the Fourth Circuit in Martin Marietta, Martin
Marietta wanted to disclose only the previously revealed documents, as
defense counsel in Nobles tried to reveal only the investigator's testimony.

